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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-PUBLIC DOES NOT
HAVE ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT AGENCY
INFORMATION
Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester (1986)
The United States Supreme Court has decided that the first 1 and
fourteenth 2 amendments to the Constitution guarantee the public and
the press a right of access to criminal trials.3 This constitutional right of
access was reinforced when the Court extended first amendment public
access to trials involving minor victims of sexual offenses, 4 to voir dire
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... Id. The first amendment does not expressly guarantee or preclude a
right of access to information with respect to the public or press. See id.
2. Id. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Id. amend XIV § 1. The fourteenth amendment has been interpreted as making
the first amendment applicable to the states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925) ("[F]reedom of speech and of the press-which are protected
by the First Amendment . . . are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States.")
3. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Rich-
mond Newspapers, the criminal defendant requested that his fourth trial for mur-
der be closed to the public to prevent the possibility of another mistrial. Id. at
559. The prosecution left the motion for closure to the discretion of the court.
Id. at 560. Relying on a state statute giving the court discretionary power to
exclude persons whose presence might impair a fair trial, the trial judge ordered
closure. Id. Richmond Newspapers' motion to vacate the closure order was un-
successful. Id. at 560-61. The newspaper appealed, but the Virginia Supreme
Court dismissed the newspaper's mandamus and prohibition petition and de-
nied its petition for appeal. Id. at 562. After granting certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court held that the first and fourteenth amendment guaranteed
the public a right of access to criminal trials which could only be denied by an
overriding interest in closure. Id. at 580-81. Without defining the circumstances
that would constitute an overriding interest, the Supreme Court suggested vari-
ous alternatives to closure. Id. at 581. For example, the Court believed that
sequestering the jurors would guard against their receiving any improper infor-
mation. Id. The Court recognized that these alternatives would be difficult for
trial courts to carry out, but not unmanageable. Id. The Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court because the trial court had made no findings of an overrid-
ing interest. Id.
4. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In Globe
Newspaper, the Court reiterated its belief that the first amendment right of access
to criminal trials is not absolute. Id. at 606 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
(789)
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proceedings 5 and to preliminary hearings. 6 In the cases involving ac-
cess to court proceedings, the Supreme Court has been influenced by
the history of open trials and the positive role of public access in the
fairness of the trial.7 In Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester,8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently had the opportu-
nity to extend the first amendment right of access to government-held
documents. 9 Instead, the Third Circuit refused to extend the constitu-
539, 570 (1976)). While the Court found the interest in protecting minor vic-
tims of sexual offenses from further psychological distress to be compelling, it
nonetheless found that such a compelling interest did not justify mandatory clo-
sure since the interest could be protected on a case-by-case determination of
whether closure is necessary. Id. at 607-08. Because the Virginia closure statute
was not narrowly tailored to protect the state's compelling interest, the Court
found the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 609-11.
5. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press Enter-
prise I). Press Enterprise I involved the right of access to voir dire proceedings of a
trial for the rape and murder of a teenage girl. Id. at 503. Although petitioner,
Press-Enterprise Co., moved for access to the entire voir dire transcript, the trial
court granted access only to the "general voir dire" which consisted of three days
out of six weeks. Id. Additionally, the trial court refused to give the petitioner
access to the transcripts of the voir dire, thereby agreeing with the parties that the
transcripts contained statements by the jurors "that do not appear to be appro-
priate for public discussion." Id. at 503-04. The court of appeals denied peti-
tioner's request for a writ of mandamus for the release of the transcripts and to
vacate the closure order. Id. at 504-05. Additionally, petitioner's request for a
hearing by the California Supreme Court was also denied. Id. at 505. The
United States Supreme Court found that closed proceedings were only appro-
priate when "based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 510. Finding that the trial
court failed to consider alternatives to closure of the voir dire and that the order
to close the transcripts was too sweeping, the court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case. Id. at 513.
6. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986) (Press-
Enterprise I). The issue in Press Enterprise H concerned the right to access to
preliminary hearings in a criminal trial. Id. at 2738. The petitioner, Press-Enter-
prise Co., sought and was denied access to the transcripts of the preliminary
hearings on the complaint in a case involving the alleged murder of 12 patients
by a nurse. Id. After the defendant nurse waived his right to ajury trial, the trial
court released the transcripts because there was no longer the threat of a biased
jury. Id. at 2739. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court considered the case and
concluded that "[t]he considerations that led the Court to apply the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials . . . and the selection ofjurors ...
lead . . . to . . . [the conclusion] that the right of access applies to preliminary
hearings as conducted in California." Id. at 2741.
7. See, e.g., id. at 2740 ("In ... [cases regarding access to trials] the Court
has traditionally considered whether public access plays a significant positive
role .... "); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980)
(history of criminal trial is instructive because "throughout its evolution, the
trial has been open to all who cared to observe"). For a discussion of the
Court's consideration of history and the role of the public, see infra notes 99-118
and accompanying text.
8. 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
9. Id. at 1166-67. Capital Cities involved public access to documents held by
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (D.E.R.). Id. at 1166.
790
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tional right of access to such documents, reasoning that access decisions
are best left to the legislature.' 0
In Capital Cities, a major northeast Pennsylvania supplier of drinking
water, Pennsylvania Gas & Water Company, restricted the water use of
250,000 customers in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, after an outbreak of
giardiasis, an intestinal illness caused by the contamination of drinking
water by giardia cysts."I Following the giardiasis outbreak, a Wilkes-
Barre newspaper, the Times Leader,12 began an in-depth investigation
into the cause of the contamination and the possible culpability of the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (D.E.R.). 13 Dur-
ing the course of the investigation, the Times Leader published articles' 4
implying that the D.E.R. selectively enforced environmental laws, partic-
ularly those regarding sewage discharges in Roaring Brook and Spring
Brook Townships, the two townships which were the most likely sources
of giardia cyst contamination in the Pennsylvania Gas and Water Com-
pany watershed. 15
In order to facilitate its investigation, the Times Leader sought access
to documents and records respecting the activities of the D.E.R. in the
For a further discussion of the facts of Capital Cities, see infra notes 11-27 and
accompanying text.
10. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1167. The Third Circuit found that "affirma-
tive rights of access to government-held information ... depend upon political
decisions made by the people and their elected representatives." Id. For a dis-
cussion of the Third Circuit's holding and the reasoning supporting its holding,
see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
11. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1165. As a result of the contamination by
giardia cysts, over four hundred persons contracted giardiasis. Id. The Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Resources (D.E.R.) and the Pennsylvania
Department of Health made public announcements about the contamination
and placed customers on water use restrictions. Id. at 1179 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
12. Id. at 1165. The Times Leader is a Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania newspaper
published by Capital Cities Media, Inc. Id.
13. Id. The Times Leader extensively examined the job performance of the
D.E.R. and its officials because the D.E.R. was responsible for enforcing federal
and state environmental laws respecting water quality. Id. at 1179 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
14. Id. at 1165. The Times Leader published approximately 400 news articles
and opinion pieces dealing with the disease and investigation. Id. Approxi-
mately one-fifth of the articles focused on the D.E.R. and the individual defend-
ants. Id. The individual defendants were officials of the Northeast Region of the
D.E.R., namely, the Regional Director, the Community Relations Coordinator,
and the Secretary. Id. at 1164.
15. Id. at 1165-66. Articles and opinions pieces concerning the D.E.R.
questioned "whether political influence or other improper considerations led
D.E.R. selectively to enforce its environmental mandate." Id. at 1165. Because
Roaring Brook Township and Spring Brook Township were "identified by [the]
D.E.R. as the most likely sources of the giardia cyst contamination," the Times
Leader articles focused on the D.E.R.'s enforcement strategy in these townships.
Id. at 1165-66.
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contaminated communities. 16 The D.E.R. allowed the Times Leader to
inspect a substantial number of documents at the D.E.R.'s Northeast Re-
gional offices but certain other documents were withheld.' 7 To justify
withholding these documents, the D.E.R. cited the statewide department
policy preventing inspection of interoffice memorandum, documents re-
lating to attorney/client relationships and citizen complaints.' 8 The
D.E.R., however, was not able to find a copy of the statewide policy.' 9
An assistant counsel for D.E.R., moreover, informed the Times Leader
that there was no formal policy on public access to information and that
each regional D.E.R. office could implement its own standards.2 0 The
D.E.R. furnished the Times Leader with a copy of its "Public Information
General Policy and Guidelines" which allow public access to departmen-
tal records and documents with a few exceptions. 2 ' Consistent with
Pennsylvania statutory laws, the D.E.R. Guidelines do not require the
agency to give access to non-public records. 2 2 The D.E.R. thus believed
16. Id. at 1166. The Times Leader submitted a written request to the D.E.R.
for access to documents, including: 1) records identifying the 80 to 85 known
sewage violators in Spring Brook Township; 2) records showing dates of surveys
made to identify the sewage violators; 3) correspondence between the D.E.R.
and Spring Brook Township officials during the past 10 years; 4) permits issued
and correspondence concerning the sewage problems in Roaring Brook Estates;
5) permits issued and correspondence concerning the sewage problems in Elm-
brook Development; 6) correspondence between the D.E.R. and Roaring Brook
Township officials during the past 10 years. Id.
17. Id. The documents withheld included 1) reports of citizen complaints;
2) letters to or received from the D.E.R.'s legal counsel; 3) technial personnel
memoranda that discussed enforcement strategy and options; and 4) technical
personnel memoranda that discussed the result of the D.E.R.'s investigations of
the contamination. Id.
18. Id. In a letter from Mark R. Carmon, Community Relations Coordinator
for the D.E.R., to the Times Leader, Mr. Carmon stated: "Department policy
statewide allows for review of all files at Regional Offices and in Harrisburg with
the following exceptions: 1) Interoffice memorandum; 2) Documents relating to
attorney/client relationship; and 3) Citizen complaints." Id. at 1179-80 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 1166.
20. Id. The Times Leader requested a copy of the D.E.R.'s statewide policy on
withholding documents but an assistant counsel for the D.E.R. later informed
the newspaper that there was no formal statewide policy. Id. Additionally, the
assistant counsel told the paper that each regional office could decide what in-
formation would be disclosed or withheld. Id.
21. Id. The D.E.R.'s "Public Information General Policy and Guidelines"
states that "[a]ll citizens shall be provided access to [d]epartmental records and
documents," with exceptions consistent with Pennsylvania's definition of "pub-
lic record." Id. For the definition of "public record," under Pennsylvania law,
see infra note 22.
22. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1166. The D.E.R.'s "Public Information Gen-
eral Policy and Guidelines" cross references to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 66.1(2) for
the definition of non-public records. Id. at 1180 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The
Pennsylvania statute provides in pertinent part:
The term "public records" shall not mean any report, communication
or other paper, the publication of which would disclose the institution,
[Vol. 32: p. 789
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that Pennsylvania law granted it discretionary power to withhold the in-
formation requested by the Times Leader.23
The Times Leader brought an action in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania contending that the first
and fourteenth amendments gave it a constitutional right of access to
the withheld information.2 4 The Times Leader further contended that the
D.E.R.'s arbitrary policy regarding disclosure of information deprived
the newspaper of the equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. 2 5 The district court dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim under the first amendment and equal protec-
tion clause. 26 The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district
progress or result of an investigation undertaken by an agency in the
performance of its official duties .... it shall not include any record,
document, material, exhibit, pleading, report, memorandum or other
paper, access to or the publication of which is prohibited, restricted or
forbidden by statute law or order or decree of court, or which would
operate to the prejudice or impairment of a person's reputation or per-
sonal security, or which would result in the loss by the Commonwealth
or any of its political subdivisions ... of Federal funds, excepting there-
from however the record of any conviction of a criminal act."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
23. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1180 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons
believed that by the D.E.R.'s interpretaton of the statute, the fact that a docu-
ment is not designated a public record [by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2)] does
not prevent its disclosure," but leaves that decision to the discretion of the
agency official. Id. For a further discussion ofJudge Gibbons' dissent, see infra
notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
24. Capital Cities, 787 F.2d at 1165-67. The Times Leader argued that the first
amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, re-
quires agency officials to allow public access to its agency's investigative infor-
mation or to set forth a compelling state interest to support its denial of access.
Id. at 1166-67. The Times Leader contended that this right of access is necessary
to have an informed electorate and to keep the government accountable to that
electorate. Id.
25. Id. at 1165. The Times Leader's equal protection argument was based on
its allegations that the D.E.R. had allowed some individuals access to informa-
tion while it denied access to the Times Leader in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1176. For the relevant text of the
fourteenth amendment, see supra note 2.
26. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1165. The district court further held that it
was prohibited from considering the state law basis for the Times Leader's claim of
access to the records because of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the elev-
enth amendment in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984). Id. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment
does not permit a federal court to consider state-law claims brought into federal
court under pendent jurisdiction. Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 121. Apply-
ing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the eleventh amendment to this case,
the district court, therefore, could not consider the Times Leader's state law
claims. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1165. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court on this issue. Id. at 1176-77.
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court's dismissal of the Times Leader's first amendment right of access
claim, and reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the
equal protection claim. 27
Judge Stapleton, writing for the majority, 28 began his constitutional
analysis by recognizing the value of an informed electorate in a democ-
racy.2 9 The court realized, however, that an informed electorate does
not necessitate that citizens be provided with access to all government
information.3 0 The Third Circuit stated that while the ideal of an in-
formed electorate is promoted by the first amendment's prohibition of
government interference with the flow of information to the public,3 ' an
affirmative right of access to government-held information should be de-
termined by a legislature elected by the people.3 2 As a basis for this
conclusion, the court first found that it strained the text of the first
amendment to interpret the explicit preclusion of government interfer-
ence as giving each citizen a presumptive right of access to all govern-
ment-held information.3 3 Secondly, the court reasoned that history
27. Id. at 1177. This casebrief will deal exclusively with the Times Leader's
first amendment right of access claim. To summarize only briefly, the district
court dismissed the Times Leader's equal protection claim because its complaint
failed to identify the group receiving unfair treatment or to identify the particu-
lar information sought by those groups. Id. at 1176. On appeal, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the Times Leader had pleaded an equal protection claim. Id. The
Third Circuit read the Times Leader's complaint as claiming that the D.E.R. dis-
criminated between newsseekers by giving access to friendly newsseekers and
denying access to unfriendly ones. Id. Judge Garth, dissenting from the major-
ity opinion, believed that the Times Leader's complaint was insufficient as an equal
protection claim because it did not specifically allege selectivity by the D.E.R. Id.
at 1193 (Garth, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1165-77. Judge Stapleton was joined in his opinion by Chief
Judge Aldisert, and Judges Seitz, Hunter, Weis and Becker. Judge Adams au-
thored a concurring opinion. See id. at 1177-78 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge
Gibbons dissented in a separate opinion in whichJudges Higginbotham, Sloviter
and Mansmann joined. See id. at 1178-92 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Garth
also dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 1192-95. (Garth, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1167. Judge Stapleton stated that the "core purpose of the free
speech and press clause is to promote the circulation of information and ideas
necessary to make government by the people a workable reality." Id.
30. Id. The court found it was not necessary, desirable or even possible to
provide citizens with access to all government information. Id. Therefore, the
court believed that the issues to be resolved included which government infor-
mation must be made available to the public and what criteria should be used to
determine which information to make available. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. For a discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text.
33. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1168. The court believed that the first amend-
ment explicitly precludes the government from: 1) interfering with or punishing
anyone who is attempting to speak or publish; 2) interfering "with one reading
or hearing that which someone else wishes to communicate"; 3) interfering with
the flow of information at a prepublication stage; 4) interfering "with those seek-
ing information to communicate to others"; and 5) interfering "with the flow of
information through the closure of governmental proceedings that historically
6
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indicates that the founders of our country left decisions concerning dis-
closure of government information to the democratic process. 34 The
court found that even those participants in the Constitutional Conven-
tion and state assemblies on ratification of the Constitution who be-
lieved that constitutional provisions concerning an informed public were
inadequate conceded that the legislature has always had discretionary
power to conceal certain important transactions.3 5 The court noted that
history further revealed that the legislative and executive branches had a
tradition of controlling access to information through the political
process. 36
have been open to the public." Id. at 1167-68. The court rejected extending the
first amendment to include a right to access to information when it stated: "[i]t
simply does not seem reasonable to suppose that the free speech clause would
speak, as it does, solely to government interference if the drafters had thereby
intended to create a right to know and a concomitant governmental duty to dis-
closure." Id. at 1168.
34. Id. The court recognized that "[t]he concern for an informed public led
to the adoption of a number of constitutional provisions." Id. These provisions
are: 1) Article I, Section 9 which provides in part that "a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time"; 2) Article II, Section 3 which provides in part that the Presi-
dent "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of
the Union"; 3) Article I, Section 5 which provides in part that "[e]ach House
shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such Parts as may in theirJudgment require Secrecy"; and 4) the first
amendment's preclusion of government interference with speech and press. Id.
35. Id. at 1169. Patrick Henry, participant in a state assembly on ratifica-
tion, was quoted by the court as one who was displeased with those constitu-
tional provisions which allowed Congress to keep its proceedings secret. Id.
Denouncing the ambiguity of the publication clause, Patrick Henry, at the Vir-
ginia Ratification Convention, stated:
Give us at least a plausible apology why Congress should keep their
proceedings in secret. They have the power of keeping them secret as
long as they please (in article I, section 2, clause 3), for the provision
for a periodical publication is too inexplicit and ambiguous to avail any
thing. The expression from time to time, as I have more than once ob-
served, admits of any extension. They may carry on the most wicked
and pernicious of schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties
of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions
of their rulers may be concealed from them. The most iniquitous plots
may be carried on against their liberty and happiness.
Id. (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CON-
VENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 169-70 (J. Elliot, ed. 1881)) [hereinafter
cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATE]. However, the Third Circuit noted that despite his
criticism of the publication clause, Henry had conceded that not all transactions
should be disclosed, such as those related to "military operations or affairs of
great consequence.., till the end which required their secrecy should have been
effected." Id. (quoting ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 170).
36. Id. at 169-70. The court found that the members of the First Congress
had held closed proceedings. Id. at 169. The court weighed the actions of the
First Congress heavily in light of the Supreme Court's recent observation that
"the First Congress 'was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always
been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in the inter-
7
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The Third Circuit then proceeded to review the Supreme Court de-
cisions which have considered a first amendment right to government-
held information.3 7 The court began by emphasizing the precedential
value of Houchins v. HQED, Inc.3 8 in which the United States Supreme
Court rejected the idea of a first amendment right of public access to all
information held by the government. 39 Because the Constitution af-
fords no guidelines for standards governing disclosure or access to in-
formation, the Supreme Court in Houchins was concerned that judges
would be forced to fashion ad hoc standards.40 Relying on Houchins, the
pretation of that fundamental instrument'." Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75
(1926))). Both the Senate and the House eventually opened floor debates to the
public, (the Senate in 1794 and the House after the War of 1812), but committee
sessions remained closed until the mid-1970's. Id. The Senate is presently op-
erating under a 1980 resolution which provides for systematic public access to
nonsensitive records. Id.
The Third Circuit also used Thomas Jefferson's refusal to turn over the
Burr papers to ChiefJustice Marshall as an illustration of the executive branch's
tradition of controlling access to government information. Id. at 1170. The
court reasoned that Thomas Jefferson reserved the right to determine what in-
formation he was obligated to release when he stated:
With respect to papers, there is certainly a public and a private side
to our offices. To the former belong grants of land, patents for inven-
tions, certain commissions, proclamations, and other papers patent in
their nature. To the other belong mere executive proceedings. All na-
tions have found it necessary, that for the advantageous conduct of
their affairs, some of these proceedings, at least, should remain known
to their executive functionary only. He, of course, from the nature of
the case, must be the sole judge of which of them the public interests
will permit publication. Hence, under our Constitution, in requests of
papers, from the legislative to the executive branch, an exception is
carefully expressed, as to those which he may deem the public welfare
may require not to be disclosed ....
Id. (citing RANDALL, 3 LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 211 (1858), reprinted in WIG-
GINS, FREEDOM OF SECREcY, 67-68 (1964)). As further support for its holding
that decisions regarding how much government information must be disclosed
are political decisions best made by the people and their elected representatives,
the court found that "the judiciary has never asserted the institutional compe-
tence to make such decisions." Id. at 1171.
37. Id. at 1171-76.
38. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
39. Id. at 9. In Houchins, the press requested access to county jail facilities,
contending that access was necessary to promote the public's right to discuss
and criticize the prison system and its administration. Id. at 3-4. A majority of
the court in Houchins held that there is no first amendment right of press access
to government information. Id. at 15. The Court found that the unquestionable
right to gather news does not compel private persons or governments to supply
information. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 14. ChiefJustice Burger stated:
There is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose, or for
standards governing disclosure of or access to information. Because
the Constitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory standards, hun-
dreds of judges would, under the Court of Appeals' approach, be at
large to fashion ad hoc standards, in individual cases, according to their
8
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Third Circuit rejected the Times Leader's suggestion of invoking a "com-
pelling state interest" analysis because it would necessarily "involve
standardless decisionmaking."
4 1
Next, the Third Circuit considered the Supreme Court cases relied
upon by the Times Leader, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,4 2 Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,4 3 and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court 4 4
in which the Court recognized a first amendment right of access to cer-
tain judicial proceedings. 4 5 Although the Third Circuit did not believe
that these cases "expressly or impliedly overrule[d] Houchins,'" 4 6 the
court recognized that the cases do advance a two-tier analysis for deter-
own ideas of what seems "desirable" or "expedient." We, therefore,
reject the Court of Appeals' conclusory assertion that the public and the
media have a First Amendment right to government information regard-
ing the conditions of jails and their inmates and presumably all other
public facilities such as hospitals and mental institutions.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1172. The Third Circuit found that a compel-
ling state interest analysis does not eliminate the problem of the lack of discerni-
ble constitutional standards as identified in Houchins. Id. The court believed
that balancing the individual's right of access against a competing state interest
would involve standardless decisionmaking when valuing the state's interest in
secrecy. Id. The court noted:
As one commentator has pointed out, while the need for military se-
crecy in time of war may be obvious, how can a court meaningfully
value "the less obvious, less dramatic consequences of disclosure of any
one of millions of documents that are the stuff of governing and of
international relations?
Id. (quoting Henkin, The Right to Know And the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 278-79 (1971)).
42. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). For a discussion of Richmond Newspapers, see supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
43. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). For a discussion of Globe Newspaper, see supra note
4 and accompanying text.
44. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). For a discussion of Press Enterprise I, see supra note
5 and accompanying text.
45. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1173-74; see Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press Enterprise I) (first amendment right of open
trial extends to voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596 (1982) (state statute closing trials involving minor victims of sexual
offenses violated first amendment right of access); Richmond Newspaper v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (public has first amendment right of access to crimi-
nal trials); see also Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986)
(Press Enterprise II) (extending first amendment right of access to preliminary
hearings).
46. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1173. The court stated:
While these cases clearly represent a significant development, they
do not expressly or impliedly overrule Houchins. These cases hold no
more than that the government may not close government proceedings
which historically have been open unless public access contributes
nothing of significant value to that process or unless there is a compel-
ling state interest in closure and a carefully tailored resolution of the
conflict between that interest and First Amendment concerns.
Id. For a discussion of Houchins, see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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mining whether there is a first amendment right of access to various as-
pects of judicial proceedings. 4 7 Specifically, the Third Circuit noted
that under Richmond Newspapers and its progeny, in cases dealing with an
asserted first amendment right of access, a court should first evaluate
whether the place or process has historically been open to the press and
general public. 4 8 Cases involving access to judicial proceedings show
that a tradition of open trials dating back to colonial times gives rise to a
presumption of openness regarding judicial proceedings. 4 9 The second
consideration is "whether public access plays a significant positive role
in the functioning of the particular process in question . O..."50 When
both "tests of experience and logic" are satisfied, a first amendment
right of access is upheld unless that right is overridden by a compelling
state interest in closing the proceedings. 5 '
Finally, the Third Circuit applied the two-tier analysis to the facts of
the case before it.52 Conceding that the second tier was satisfied, 53 the
47. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1173. The Third Circuit recognized that each
of the three cases applied the same two-tier analysis which is currently espoused
by a majority of the court. Id. This analysis provides that " 'resolution of First
Amendment public access claims in individual cases must be strongly influenced
by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of the specific struc-
tural value of public access in the circumstances.' " Id. (quoting Richmond
Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597-98 (1980) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring)). The two-tier analysis originated as two "helpful principles" in Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia. See Richmond News-
papers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588-89 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
For a further discussion of the two-tier analysis, see infra notes 48-54 and accom-
panying text.
48. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1174. The court recognized that "tradition of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience." Id. (quoting Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2740 (1986)).
49. Id. The Third Circuit believed that a tradition of access played a crucial
role in Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (Press Enterprise 1) (presumption of open trials as
important today as has been for centuries); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) (since time organic laws were adopted pre-
sumption of openness of criminal trials has remained secure); Richmond News-
papers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (historic evidence of time when
our organic laws were adopted demonstrates that criminal trials had long been
presumptively open).
50. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1174 (quoting Press-Enterprise H, 106 S. Ct. at
2740). This requirement has the effect of avoiding access to government opera-
tions that function best in secret, such as the grand jury system. Press-Enterprise
H, 106 S. Ct. at 2741.
51. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1173 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)). The Third Circuit stated that if there is a
compelling state interest in closure, resolution of the conflict between the state
interest and first amendment concerns must be carefully tailored. Id.
52. Id. at 1174-76. Although not certain, the Third Circuit assumed that
the Supreme Court would apply its two-tier analysis of access to judicial pro-
ceedings to the question of access to executive agency records. Based on this
assumption, the Third Circuit applied the analysis to the facts of the case. Id. at
1174.
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Third Circuit stated that the Times Leader did not satisfy the first historic
tier of the analysis because it neither pleaded nor offered to prove the
existence of a tradition of public access to administrative records. 54 The
Third Circuit indicated that the evidence offered by the Times Leader-a
Pennsylvania statute ordering disclosure of public documents5 5 and evi-
dence of the D.E.R.'s practice respecting access 56 "refer[red] solely to
present, not historic practice." 5 7
Judge Adams, in a concurring opinion, 58 also concluded that the
Times Leader's evidence offered in support of a tradition of access was
"far too recent and far too narrow to bear the weight assigned to it."'5 9
53. Id. at 1174-75. The court conceded that the structural value require-
ment of the access analysis was satisfied by the Times Leader's allegations that
public access was necessary to evaluate the D.E.R.'s job performance in protect-
ing the environment in Northeast Pennsylvania. Id. The court was required to
assume that the Times Leader would be able to prove the facts which it alleged
since the case was before the Third Circuit on appeal from an order denying the
newspaper's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissal of its complaint.
Id. at 1165.
54. Id. at 1175. Because the Times Leader failed to allege a tradition of pub-
lic access, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal of the
paper's amended complaint must be sustained. Id.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.2 (Purdon 1957). The statute states: "Every
public record of an agency shall, at reasonable times, be open for examination
and inspection by any citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." Id. For a
further discussion of the Pennsylvania statute on inspection and copying of
records, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
56. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1175. The Times Leader filed an affidavit, indi-
cating that the D.E.R. was inconsistent in its disclosure of non-public documents
and that some non-public documents had been provided to the paper for inspec-
tion. Id.
57. Id. at 1175 (emphasis in original). Because the Supreme Court's analy-
sis of historic practice in judicial proceeding access cases dated back to colonial
times and beyond, the Third Circuit seemed to indicate that post-colonial his-
tory is not relevant to the tradition of access analysis. Id. at 1175 n.27. The
Third Circuit stated that in the Supreme Court's view, historic analysis is valua-
ble for "what is revealed about the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers of the
First Amendment." Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise Company v. Superior Court,
106 S. Ct. at 2748 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
58. Id. at 1177-78 (Adams, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 1178 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams believed that the
Times Leader could not demonstrate a tradition of openness. Id. Judge Adams
rejected the historical showing offered by Judge Gibbons in his dissent which
included the following:
(1) A Pennsylvania statute, enacted in 1957,which mandates that
members of the public shall have access to agency records, with the
exception of certain types of documents, such as agency investigative
reports and materials subject to attorney-client privilege; and (2) Penn-
sylvania law permits the disclosure of all of the documents sought by the
plaintiffs, with the arguable exception of materials covered by attorney-
client privilege.
Id. (Adams, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Compared to the historic
practices dating back to colonial times examined in judicial proceeding access
cases, Judge Adams believed that the Times Leader's evidence was too recent and
narrow. Id. (Adams, J., concurring).
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Distinguishing this case from his dissent in First Amendment Coalition v.
Judicial Inquiry and Review Board,60 Judge Adams asserted the relevant
historical inquiry required consideration not only of the D.E.R.'s prior
practice, but also of access to administrative records in general. 6 1 While
emphasizing the importance of history to a claim of access, 6 2 Judge Ad-
ams recognized that in certain circumstances, access to government pro-
ceedings might be so essential to democracy that it would be mandated
without a demonstration of a tradition of access. 6 3 However, because
Capital Cities was not such a case, and a tradition of access had not been
demonstrated, Judge Adams agreed with the majority's conclusion that a
right of access to the D.E.R.'s records was not warranted under the first
amendment.64
Judge Gibbons wrote a lengthy dissent to the majority opinion.6 5
After a detailed recitation of the facts of the case,6 6 Judge Gibbons be-
60. 784 F.2d 467, 481-90 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In First Amendment Coalition, the Third Circuit found that
neither the press nor the public have a right of access to proceedings of Penn-
sylvania's Judicial Inquiry and Review Board before formal charges have been
pressed because the judicial disciplinary process lacks a tradition of openness.
Id. at 472. Judge Adams, dissenting from the majority opinion, believed that the
historic inquiry required consideration of impeachment proceedings which are
analogous to the modern-day judicial disciplinary process. Id. at 481 (Adams,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). When impeachment proceedings are
included in the historic analysis, Judge Adams believed the tradition of access
tier was satisfied. Id. at 485 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
61. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1177 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams
referred to the majority opinion in which Judge Stapleton noted that the rele-
vant historic practice was not specifically that of the D.E.R., but rather the prac-
tice of access to the type of administrative records in dispute. Id. at 1177, 1178
(Adams, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 1177 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams stated: "[A]s Justice
Brennan has written, a prior history of openness has been viewed as significant
not only 'because the Constitution carries the gloss of history' but also because
'a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.' " Id.
(Adams, J., concurring) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 605 (1982) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
63. Id. at 1177 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams stated:
One could envision a special case, perhaps, where access to govern-
mental proceedings might be deemed so significant to a democratic
government that the First Amendment would mandate access even
without a showing of a tradition of openness. This, however, is not
such a case. And under the analysis set forth in the Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence, a showing of historical access appears
essential in the usual situation.
Id. (Adams, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1177-78. For discussion of Judge Adams' belief that a showing of
tradition of access was not made, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
65. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1178-92 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Hig-
ginbotham, Sloviter and Mansmann joined in Judge Gibbons' dissent. Id. at
1178 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1179-82 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
800
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gan an analysis of the first amendment access involved in Capital Cities.6 7
First, Judge Gibbons reviewed the purposes of the first amendment
speech-press clause. 68 He found that the most widely accepted purpose
of the speech-press clause is "its value in serving as a restraint upon the
abuse of power by public officials." '6 9 Judge Gibbons then examined the
majority's rejection of this "checking value" 70 of the speech-press
clause, 7 1 criticizing the majority's interpretation of the speech-press
clause 72 and the historical justification for its rejection of the checking
value of the clause.
73
67. Id. at 1181-82 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons began by not-
ing that the following issues were not presented by the Capital Cities case:
1) whether the first amendment applies to the commonwealth; 2) whether the
Times Leader was entitled to right of access superior to that of the general public;
3) whether reasonable time, place and manner restrictions upon access to infor-
mation were present; 4) whether certain types of government information must
be withheld; and 5) whether the executive branch official had attempted to make
a showing of a legitimate governmental interest which is protected by nondisclo-
sure. Id. at 1182 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1183-86 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons gave examples
of purposes advanced for the speech-press clause: 1) freedom of expression is
essential to individual autonomy; 2) speech-press clause assures competition in
the marketplace of ideas; and 3) speech-press clause is essential to the funda-
mental constitutional principle of self-government. Id. at 1183 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. at 1184 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). James Madison, the author of the
speech-press clause was the first to justify the clause as a restraint on the abuse
of government power by government officials. Id. at 1183, 1184 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). Judge Gibbons found that Justice Brennan had relied on Madison's
"checking value" of the speech-press clause in the landmark first amendment
case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Id. at 1184 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citing
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964)). Judge Gibbons
further found that Madison's "checking value" and the self-government princi-
ple were relevant whenever the government attempts to withhold information
from the public. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1184-85 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons noted that lead-
ing first amendment commentators refer to Madison's restraint on the abuse of
government justification for the speech-press clause as the checking value of the
first amendment. Id. at 1184 (Gibbons,J., dissenting); see also Blasi, The Checking
Value in First Amendment Theory, A.B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 523 (1977).
71. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1184 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons
believed that the majority's rejection of the checking value of the first amend-
ment is demonstrated by the court's statement that: "It simply does not seem
reasonable to suppose that the free speech clause would speak, as it does, solely
to government interference if the drafters had thereby intended to create a right
to know and a concomitant governmental duty to disclose." Id. (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
72. Id. at 1185 (Gibhons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons found illogical, the
majority's reasoning thai the first amendment imposes no duty on the govern-
ment because it only limits governmental action. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). Judge Gibbons believed that the majority's reasoning was as
illogical as saying that the fourth amendment does not require the government
to recognize a right of privacy because the fourth amendment does not address
invasions of privacy. Id. at 1184-85 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1185-86 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Because many of the historical
13
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Finally, after noting that nondisclosure of government information
was a prior restraint upon free speech which demanded an extremely
high level ofjustification, 7 4 judge Gibbons examined the governing case
law. 75 Judge Gibbons, unimpressed with the Houchins decision, 76 fo-
cused his attention on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gannet Co., Inc.
v. DePasquale77 which demonstrated to him that there was no majority
support for Houchins.7 8 Judge Gibbons concluded that the cases from
references made by the majority antedate the first amendment, Judge Gibbons
found that material unpersuasive. Id. at 1185 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). In addi-
tion, the precedential value ofJefferson's claim of executive privilege in the Burr
case referred to by the majority was unanimously rejected in United States v.
Nixon. Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974)) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting).
Judge Gibbons also criticized the majority's reliance on the Freedom of In-
formation Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1984), the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.,
§ 552a (1984) and the Government in Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C. § 552b
(1982), as support for their holding. Id. at 1185-86 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Although legislative enactments may support the fact that elected legislative offi-
cials are responsive to the information needs of the public, Judge Gibbons as-
serted that legislative action does not negate the constitutional right of access to
information. Id.
74. Id. at 1186 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stated that it has
been long recognized that prior restraints upon the dissemination of informa-
tion required an extremely high level of justification. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing); see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931) (liberty of
press is especially cherished in this country to avoid previous restraint). Judge
Gibbons believed that the ignorance caused by nondisclosure was a prior re-
straint upon speech, asserting that the prior restraint would stifle public debate
about governmental affairs because the public would be uninformed about gov-
ernment activity. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1186 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
75. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1187-91 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a dis-
cussion of the governing case law, see infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
76. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1187-88 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gib-
bons believed that the dicta in Houchins relied on by the majority is ambiguous.
Id. at 1187. Further, Judge Gibbons noted that Houchins was a plurality opinion
by three members of the Court and because only seven justices participated in
the case, it did not represent the majority view of the court. Id. at 1187-88 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting). Moreover, Houchins involved physical access to a prison
rather than access to information. Id. at 1188 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a
further discussion of Houchins, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
77. 447 U.S. 368 (1979). In DePasquale, the petitioner sought, and was de-
nied, access to the transcripts of a pretrial hearing in a murder case. Id. at 375-
76. The hearing had been closed to the public at the request of the defendant
and without objection by the prosecution in order to ensure defendant's right to
a fair trial. Id. at 375. The issue in DePasquale was whether the public has a
constitutional right of access to the information sought by the petitioner. Id. at
370. The New York Court of Appeals held that the presumption of access to
criminal trials was "overcome in this case because of the danger posed to the
defendants' ability to receive a fair trial." Id. at 377. The Supreme Court held
that notwithstanding the petitioners' argument to the contrary, there is no sixth
amendment right "in members of the public to insist upon a public trial." Id. at
381. Additionally, the Court held that there is no constitutional right of access
to this pretrial proceeding, and affirmed the New York judgment. Id. at 394.
78. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1188 (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons
reasoned that since Justice Stewart assumed in DePasquale that there was a first
802 [Vol. 32: p. 789
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DePasquale through Press-Enterprise demonstrate that the right of access to
government-held information is guaranteed by the first amendment and
can only be denied by a compelling state interest in nondisclosure, and
that such a denial must be narrowly defined. 79 In addition, Judge Gib-
bons criticized the majority's reliance on the lack of a tradition of access
to administrative records. 80 According to Judge Gibbons, this reliance
allowed the majority to avoid a compelling state interest test which the
government's case could not otherwise withstand. 8 '
As a threshold consideration of the divergent opinions in this case,
it is submitted that by following the Houchins decision, the Third Circuit
amendment right of access to criminal trials and Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Rehnquist, Stevens and Powell concurred in the opinion, there was no ma-
jority support for dicta in Houchins which implied no first amendment right of
access. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Powell asserted that
the first amendment protects the right of access to governmental information.
Id. at 1188 (citing DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-93, 379-403) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting)).
79. Id. at 1189 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Smith, 776
F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985) (compelling state interest in protecting privacy rights
outweighs first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings); Publicker
Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (failure to articulate overrid-
ing interests and failure to consider less restrictive means to protect privacy in-
terest was abuse of discretion). Judge Gibbons found that Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia expresses the first amendment right implied in DePasquale. Capital Cities,
797 F.2d at 1188-89 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 580-81 (1980)) (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons further found that
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny support a compelling state interest test for
justifying nondisclosure. Id. at 1188-89 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
80. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1190 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons
agreed that historical practice may be relevant when weighing the government's
interest in secrecy against the public's interest in access. Id. (Gibbons, J., dis-
senting). However, he also believed that the majority was imposing "an affirma-
tive pleading requirement" of articulating historical practice on a "party
asserting the protection of the first amendment." Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Not only is this pleading requirement unjustified, according to Judge Gibbons,
but it is the government who must overcome the presumption of openness by
showing a compelling state interest in closure. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1189-91 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons began his cri-
tique by stating that the significance of historical practice arguably applies only
to access to judicial proceedings and not to access to records of the legislative
and executive branches. Id. at 1190 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons,
after assuming historical practice was relevant to legislative and executive
branch files, found that the majority distorted the governing case law in order to
fashion an affirmative pleading requirement out of the historical consideration.
Id. at 1190 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons believed that the majority
errected the pleading requirement because the government did not demonstrate
a compelling state interest in secrecy which the majority could balance against
the public's need for access. Id. (Gibbons,J., dissenting). Despite the majority's
history of access requirements, Judge Gibbons believed that the pleading re-
quirement was met by the historical evidence of Pennsylvania law which permits
disclosure of the requested information. Id. at 1191 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Thus, Judge Gibbons believed that not only did the majority impose an errone-
ous pleading requirement, it also misapplied its own standard. Id. (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
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tactically ignored differences in the mediums from which the informa-
tion was requested. 8 2 However, the court was willing to recognize dif-
ferences when comparing administrative records to judicial
proceedings. 83 Therefore, the primary focus of the Third Circuit in
Capital Cities was on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Houchins, rather than on constitutional considerations articulated in the
recent Supreme Court decisions concerning access to judicial
proceedings.
84
In Houchins, the Supreme Court rejected the assertion of a first
amendment right of access to government information regarding jail
conditions. 8 5 To recognize such a right, the Court asserted, would ne-
cessitate the making of ad hoc decisions because there are no constitu-
82. Id. at 1171-73. The majority adopted reasoning analogous to the
Houchins Court but failed to identify a number of respects in which the access
issues in the two cases differ. For example, the press in Houchins asserted a right
of access to information superior to that of the general public; Houchins involved
physical access to facilities; and prison security concerns were important in
Houchins. See 438 U.S. 1-11. For a further discussion of Houchins and the Third
Circuit's reliance on the Supreme Court's reasoning, see surpa notes 36-39 and
accompanying text.
The relevant differences to consider are the differences in the mediums
from which the information is sought rather than differences in the nature of the
information sought. The Third Circuit recognized this distinction in United
States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3rd Cir. 1985). Regarding the application the
two-tier analysis formulated in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980) the court noted:
[T]he Supreme Court has not examined whether there has been a tradi-
tion of access with respect to information of the particular character
involved or whether that information is of significant public interest.
Rather, it has inquired whether there has historically been public access
to this particular part of the judicial process and whether access to that
portion of the process will significantly enhance public understanding
and appreciation of the judicial process or improve the process itself.
United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1114 (1978).
83. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1174. The Third Circuit's recognition of the
differences between administrative records and judicial proceedings is implicit
in their reluctance to apply the same analysis used in cases involving judicial
proceedings to this case. Id. Specifically, the Third Circuit stated: "We do not
yet know whether the Supreme Court will apply its analysis of access in the con-
text ofjudicial proceedings to the context of executive branch files." Id. For a
further discussion of the Third Circuit's application of the judicial proceedings
access analysis, see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
84. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1171-77. The trilogy of Supreme Court cases
concerning access to judicial proceedings includes Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (access to criminal trials); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (access to trials involving minor victims
of sexual offenses); and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501
(1984) (access to voir dire proceedings). The Third Circuit discussed these re-
cent Supreme Court access cases and applied the Court's analysis to the facts of
Capital Cities but support for the majority's decision was rooted in Houchins. See
Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1171-77. For a further discussion of Richmond Newspa-
pers and its progeny, see supra notes 3-7, 40-49 and accompanying text.
85. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14.
[Vol. 32: p. 789
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tional guidelines. 86 Similarly, the majority in Capital Cities focused on
the absence of a discernible basis for defining a constitutional duty to
disclose information as articulated in Houchins.8 7 In Capital Cities, the
majority reasoned that, because of this lack of standards, the judiciary
was not competent to make access decisions and, therefore, such deci-
sions should be left to the legislature. 8 8 It is submitted, however, that
the recent Supreme Court decisions regarding access to judicial pro-
ceedings provide the standards by which a court may, and should, ana-
lyze first amendment right of access issues. 89 Therefore, it is submitted
that these recent decisions effectively emasculate the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Houchins and thus, the Third Circuit's reliance on such rea-
soning was misplaced.
The Supreme Court cases dealing with the claim of a first amend-
ment right of access to judicial proceedings, beginning with Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., have emphasized two complementary considerations.9 0
First, the history of the government institution must demonstrate that it
has been presumptively open to the public. 9' Second, public access
must have a structural value to the functioning of the specific govern-
ment process to which access is sought.92 This structural analysis in-
volves assessing the social benefits of public access to the specific
information sought to be disclosed. In other words, public access to the
particular government institution must play "a significant role in the
functioning of the [particular government] process and the government
as a whole."' 93 These two considerations substantially allay the fear of
86. Id. For the full text of ChiefJustice Burger's position on this issue, see
supra note 40.
87. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1172. For a discussion of the absence of a
discernible basis upon which a court can support its decisions, see supra notes
39-40 and accompanying text.
88. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1171. The Third Circuit stated:
[T]hejudiciary has never asserted the institutional competence to make
such [access to information] decisions. The reason seems apparent.
Neither the free speech clause nor the structure of the government de-
scribed by the Constitution yields any principled basis for deciding
which government information must be available to the citizenry and
which need not.
Id.
89. For a discusison of these standards as presented in the recent Supreme
Court cases, see supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
90. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). For the trilogy of Supreme Court cases dealing
with the claim of a first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, see
supra note 82.
91. For a discussion of the tradition of access tier of the Supreme Court's
analysis, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
92. For a discussion of the positive value tier of the Supreme Court access
analysis, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
93. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). Evaluating the structural
value of public access to a criminal trial, Justice Brennan, writing for the major-
ity, stated: "The right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant
17
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standardless decision-making.9 4 Because courts have the standards of
history and the structural value of public access for guidance, courts
faced with a claim of a first amendment right of access are not forced to
fashion ad hoc standards as the majority in Capital Cities suggests. 9 5
Richmond Newspapers and subsequent Supreme Court access cases
provide courts with the impetus for expanding the constitutional right of
access to government-held information. 9 6 Since Richmond Newspapers,
the Third Circuit has shown a willingness to apply the Richmond Newspa-
pers analysis to right of access claims beyond the context of criminal tri-
als but not beyond that of judicial proceedings. 9 7 It is suggested,
however, that the Third Circuit's limited expansion of the right of access
reflects Justice Brennan's two-step analysis in Richmond Newspapers and
Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court which can be used to analyze a constitu-
tional right of access to government information held by the executive
and legislative branches, as well as the judicial branch.9 8
In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen,9 9 the Third Circuit addressed an
issue closely analogous to the question presented in Richmond Newspa-
pers: public access to civil trials.10 0 Narrowly reading Richmond Newspa-
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole."
Id.
94. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's concern over standardless deci-
sionmaking, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
95. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
96. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 149-59 (1980). The
Harvard commentator believed that "Richmond Newspapers provides the
[Supreme] Court with an impetus to elaborate upon the structured conception
of the first amendment that had previously only lurked in its decisions on speech
and expression." Id. at 159. Further, courts confronted with claims of access
beyond the context of criminal trials must distinguish between 1) the existence
of a right of access and 2) whether the right extends to the particular case. Id. at
157. The extension of a right of access to information, according to the com-
mentator, should be limited by "the constitutional vision of a self-governing
people." Id. at 159.
97. See e.g., First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd.,
784 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir. 1986) (two-tier analysis led to denial of right of access to
record of Judicial Inquiry Board before court imposed discipline on judge);
United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3rd Cir. 1985) (first amendment right of
access to bill of particulars based on two-tier analysis); Publicker Indus., Inc. v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir. 1984) (access to civil trials analogous to access
to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550
(3rd Cir. 1982) (right of access to pretrial suppression, due process and entrap-
ment hearings).
98. For a discussion of the cases in which the Third Circuit interpreted
ChiefJustice Brennan's two-tier analysis, see infra notes 99-118 and accompany-
ing text.
99. 733 F.2d 1059 (3rd Cir. 1984).
100. In Publicker Industries, the district court closed a December 7, 1982
hearing on a preliminary injunction stemming from a proxy fight to determine
control of Publicker Industries, Inc. 733 F.2d at 1061. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. and Dow Jones and Company sought access to the hearing but the district
court denied their request because the information involved was confidential.
806 [Vol. 32: p. 789
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pers and Globe Newspaper,10 1 the Publicker Industries court found that the
attributes of the criminal justice system which caused the Supreme
Court to find a first amendment right of access to criminal trials were
also features of the civil justice system.l0 2 First, the Third Circuit found
that civil proceedings had a tradition of access to the public.' 0 3 Second,
the court reasoned that civil trials benefit from public access. 104 There-
fore, the Third Circuit concluded that because civil and criminal trials
possess these similar attributes, the constitutional protection afforded
the public in criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers extended to civil tri-
als.' 0 5 In United States v. Criden,106 the Third Circuit decided a claim of
access to pretrial suppression hearings which, unlike criminal and civil
trials, do not share a common law history of access. 10 7 As a basis for
finding a first amendment right of access the Third Circuit placed
Id. at 1063. The newspapers appealed to the Third Circuit for a writ of
mandamanus to compel the district court to reopen the hearing. Id. The Third
Circuit denied the motion. Id. After the December 7, 1982 hearing was com-
pleted, the newspapers motioned for immediate access to the transcripts of the
hearing. Id. at 1064. Granting a motion for confidentiality by Publicker, the
district court only allowed access to the nonconfidential portions of the tran-
script. Id. The newspapers appealed, maintaining that the closing of the De-
cember 7th hearing and denial of access to the transcripts deprived them of their
common law and first amendment right of access to civil trials. Id. For a further
discussion of Publicker Industries, see Case Brief, Constitutional Law--First Amend-
ment-Public Has Right Of Access To Civil Proceedings, 30 VILL. L. REV. 980 (1985).
101. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). For a further discussion of Globe Newspaper, see
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
102. 733 F.2d at 1070.
103. Id. at 1067-69. The Publicker Industries court surveyed English and
American legal authorities similar to those reviewed in Richmond Newspapers. Id.
104. Id. at 1069-70. The Publicker Industries court found that public access to
civil trials ensures the proper administration ofjustice and provides information
which leads to a better understanding of the operations of government. Id.
105. Id. at 1070. For a further discussion of Publicker Industries, see Case
Brief, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Public Has Right of Access to Civil Pro-
ceedings, 30 VILL. L. REV. 980 (1985).
106. 675 F.2d 550 (3rd Cir. 1982).
107. Id. at 555. In Criden, a suppression hearing was held to determine
whether statements by three "Abscam" defendants to FBI agents could be sup-
pressed. Id. at 552. A reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer sought access to
the in camera hearing to which no prior notice had been given. Id. The reporter
was denied access because the subject matter was confidential. Id. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. (PN) motioned to intervene in the pending case and filed a
motion seeking access to the transcript from the suppression hearing. Id. The
district court denied the motion and PN appealed. Id. PN also sought access to
a pretrial due process hearing. Id. at 553. The district court ordered the pro-
ceeding closed because the hearing was a pretrial proceeding and the testimony
given by the defendants would not be admissible against them at the trial. Id.
The Third Circuit held that the public has a first amendment right of access to
pretrial suppression and due process hearings. Id. at 554. In so deciding, the
Third Circuit was guided by the structural analysis in Richmond Newspapers. For a
further discussion of the Criden court's interpretation of Richmond Newspapers, see
infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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greater weight on the structural values of public access than on the his-
tory of access. 10 8 The Third Circuit concluded that a first amendment
right of access to pretrial suppression hearings existed because the "six
societal interests" which the Supreme Court used to find a strong pre-
sumption of access to criminal trials also applied to pretrial
proceedings.10 9
More recently, in United States v. Smith 110 and First Amendment Coali-
tion v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Board, IlI the Third Circuit confronted
claims of access to judicial proceedings which did not have traditions of
being available to the public but which were similar to government insti-
tutions which were traditionally accessible to the public.' 12 In Smith, the
Third Circuit found a constitutional right of access to a bill of particulars
based on its close relationship to the indictment.' 13 The court reasoned
that historically, indictments have been presumptively open to the pub-
lic and access to the bill of particulars satisfies the same societal interests
as access to indictments.' 14 In First Amendment Coalition, the Third Cir-
108. Criden, 675 F.2d at 555. The Third Circuit noted that pretrial proceed-
ings have grown in importance in the last two hundred years. Id. Thus, because
the pretrial proceedings lacked history and the Supreme Court interprets the
first amendment according to current values and conditions, the Third Circuit
concentrated on the current role of the first amendment and the societal inter-
ests in open pretrial proceedings. Id.
109. Id. at 556-57. The Criden court identified the societal interests in pub-
lic access to pretrial and trial proceedings as: 1) promoting educated debate over
government affairs; 2) assuring that proceedings are conducted fairly and per-
ceived as being so; 3) providing outlets for public concern; 4) serving as a check
on the practices of the judiciary; 5) enhancing performance of proceedings and
6) discovering perjury. Id. at 556.
110. 776 F.2d 1104 (3rd Cir. 1985).
111. 784 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir. 1986).
112. For a further discussion of Smith and First Amendment Coalition, see infra
notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
113. Smith, 776 F.2d at 1104-12. In Smith, a grand jury indicted two corpo-
rations and five individuals charging them with violations of the Interstate
Transportaton in Aid of Racketeering and Mail Fraud statutes and with conspir-
ing to violate those statutes. Id. at 1105. Two individual defendants motioned
for bills of particulars requesting the identity of the unindicted co-conspirators
referred to in the indictment. Id. The trial court ordered that the co-conspira-
tors be identified and simultaneously granted a protective order regarding their
names. Id. at 1105-06. Pennsylvania newspapers filed motions seeking access to
the bills of particulars. Id. at 1106. The trial court denied access, finding that
the risk of serious injury to persons named on the bill of particulars outweighed
"any common law or First Amendment right of access" to the names. Id. at
1107. On appeal, the Third Circuit found both a first amendment and common-
law right of access to bills of particulars. Id. at 1107-10. As a basis of a first
amendment right of access the court considered the history of indictments be-
cause of their close relationship to the function of bills of particulars. Id. at
1111.
114. Id. at 1111-12. The Third Circuit found a historical and functional
relationship between indictments and bills of particulars. Id. at 1111. The
Third Circuit found that historically, indictments were detailed with no need for
supplemental information. Id. Today, however, the court found that indict-
[Vol. 32: p. 789808
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cuit found that the history of open impeachment hearings was not rele-
vant to the issue of access to the Judicial Inquiry & Review Board.' 15
The court reasoned that because the Judicial Inquiry & Review Board
did not replace traditional impeachment hearings, they were not func-
tionally equivalent and, therefore, the history of impeachment hearings
was not a proper consideration.' 16 These Third Circuit cases, it is sub-
mitted, frame the relevant historical inquiry for courts confronting a
claimed right of access to government-held information. It is thus sug-
gested that these cases demonstrate that the appropriate historical in-
quiry concerns the evolution of a particular government institution ' 17
or, in some cases, the history of a related government process which has
been replaced by the institution to which access is sought.' 18
Capital Cities presented the Third Circuit with the unique opportu-
nity to extend the Richmond Newspapers analysis to executive branch
files.' '9 The majority reluctantly applied the analysis developed in judi-
cial access cases to the context of executive branch files.' 20 However, it
is submitted that the majority squandered the opportunity to fit this case
ments contain skeletal accusations which can be supplemented by a bill of partic-
ulars if the defense has a legitimate need. Id. Functionally, the court found that
bills of particulars, like indictments: 1) provide information which the defendant
can use in his or her defense and 2) define and limit the government's case. Id.
115. 784 F.2d at 472-73. In First Amendment Coalition, the plaintiff petitioned
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus seeking access to
records of a hearing of the Judicial Inquiry & Review Board which resulted in the
dismissal of charges against Justice Larsen of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Id. at 69. The court denied the petition because it believed it was unable to
grant the request when the Judicial Inquiry & Review Board did not suggest
discipline. Id. Based on the history and practice of the Board, the district court
held that access was permitted in all cases where the Board has preferred formal
charges, but not until the Board files a record of the proceedings with the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court. Id. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district
court erred in restricting access to transcripts after the completion of formal
proceedings. Id. at 470. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court decision
because the state interests articulated in the Pennsylvania Constitution were not
overridden by an interest in public disclosure. Id. at 477.
116. Id. at 472-73. The Third Circuit stated: "Had the state constitutional
convention acted to replace traditional impeachment with a substitute vehicle
like the Judicial Inquiry & Review Board, a closer question of public access to
the successor proceedings would be presented." Id. at 472.
117. See, e.g., Publicker Industries, 733 F.2d at 1667 (traditional norm was
open trials); see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564 ("What is significant for
present purposes is that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open.") (em-
phasis added).
118. See, e.g., Frist Amendment Coalition, 784 F.2d at 472 (closer question of
public access to successor proceeding if earlier proceeding has tradition of ac-
cess); Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (history of indictment was consideration in quesion
of access to bill of particulars).
119. For a discussion of the facts of Capital Cities, see supra notes 11-25 and
accompanying text.
120. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1174. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
application of the access analysis, see supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
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into the access analysis by focusing excessive attention on the historical
inquiry. The Third Circuit failed to realize that because administrative
agencies do not have a functional equivalent at common law, the rele-
vant historical inquiry concerns access to administrative records since
the creation of administrative agencies. 12 1 The Pennsylvania statutes
concerning access to administrative records are strong evidence of his-
toric practice.' 2 2 Since 1957, Pennsylvania law has mandated that
agency records shall be accessible to the public, with the exception of
certain types of records, such as agency investigative records. 12 3 The
Third Circuit, it is suggested, should have concluded that the tradition
there, although limited, does favor public access to some agency
records. Instead, the strict application of the analysis led the majority to
demand historic evidence from the "time when our organic laws were
adopted," a time when governmental agencies did not exist and, thus,
the Third Circuit precluded disclosure of all agency records.124
Finally, it is submitted that a historical consideration was not meant
to be conclusive, especially limited historic evidence of a modern gov-
ernment institution. As Justice Brennan, the originator of the two
"helpful principles," recently commented: "History is only a starting
point. It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we can gauge
accurately the intent of the framers on application of principle to specific
contemporary questions."' 25 When a government process has become
important only recently, like administrative agencies, courts should give
greater weight to the structural analysis with guidance from the purpose
of the first amendment. The relevant purpose of the first amendment
for courts dealing with a right of access to government information is
the "purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating
to the functioning of the government."' 126 Because the complexity of
the government which resulted in the need to delegate authority to ad-
ministrative agencies also resulted in agencies being far removed from
the electorate and thus less responsible to the people,' 27 the "six socie-
121. See Capital Cities 797 F.2d at 1190 n.12 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (rule
that historical practice must date back to colonial times is absurd because gov-
ernmental agencies did not exist at that time or for 100 years thereafter).
122. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1-2 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1987).
123. Id. For the text of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) which excepts four
categories of documents from the definition of "public record", see supra note
23.
124. Capital Cities, 797 F.2d at 1175 n.27 (quoting Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)).
125. Stewart, Justice Brennan at 80, 73 A.B.A. J. 61, 62 (1987).
126. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
127. 1957 PA. LEGIS. J., 2186, 2 (1957). A proponent of House Bill 800
which became Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 65 § 66.1(2) believed public access to agency
records was necessary because the complexity of our modern government has
caused "certain agencies, departments, bureaus and commissions [to] become
little isolated mountains of power in their own right and are no longer responsi-
ble to our people." Id.
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tal interests" which mandate a strong presumption of access to criminal
trials apply equally to administrative agencies. 128 Most importantly, ac-
cess to government-held information, namely agency records, will pro-
mote informed discussion of the government and serve as a check on the
practices of administrative agencies. 129
In conclusion, it is submitted that the fear of standardless decision
making that prevented the Third Circuit from recognizing a right of ac-
cess in Capital Cities was an unfounded fear.13 0 The Supreme Court has
recently given specific guidelines for courts to follow when deciding first
amendment right of access cases which can be extended to all types of
government institutions.' 3 1 The two-tier analysis, when properly ap-
plied will result in consistent decisions-not the ad hoc decisions sug-
gested by the Third Circuit. It is therefore submitted that the Third
Circuit should have applied the two-tier analysis in Capital Cities in a
manner consistent with the purpose of the first amendment of promot-
ing informed public debate on the government and should not have
placed too much weight on the tradition of access in the face of a con-
temporary question.
Richard W. Riley
128. For a discussion of the "six societal interests", see supra note 109.
129. Cf The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 156 (1980).
The commentator stated:
Richmond Newspapers recognized that government, by virtue of its unique
institutional position, may be the exclusive possessor of information
that is necessary to informed self-government. Without a means of tap-
ping that information, public discussion about government cannot be
expected to achieve the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" quality
envisioned by the framers.
Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). It is
submitted that access to administrative records, like access to trials, dispels this
problem.
130. For a discussion of the reasons why the fear of standardless decision-
making is ungrounded, see supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the trilogy of Supreme Court cases which articu-
lated guidelines for determining a constitutional right of access, see supra notes
3-7, 45-49, & 90-98 and accompanying text.
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